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ABSTRACT: The aim of this study is to ex-
amine the relationship between the shadow 
economy  and  public  debt  in  Turkey.  We 
elaborate  on  the  questions  regarding  the 
negative effects of shadow economy on the 
sustainability of public debt observing the 
estimates about the size of shadow economy 
in Turkey. In the light of some scholars’ es-
timates, we re-evaluate the macroeconomic 
situation of Turkey. At the core of the study, 
we discuss how the government borrowing 
policies would differ if the shadow economy 
was included into the legal system. In order 
to examine the effects of shadow economy 
on sustainability, we use various sustain-
ability  indicators.  There  is  a  significant 
difference  observed  between  the  calcula-
tions which take into account the volume 
of shadow economy as a share of economic 
system  and  those  that  exclude  shadow 
economy as an exogenous variable.
KEY WORDS: Public Debt, Shadow Econ-
omy, Sustainability
APSTRAKT:  Namena  ove  studije  je  da 
razmotri  odnos  između  sive  ekonomije 
i javnog duga u Turskoj. Ušli smo u po-
jedinosti  pitanja  negativnih  dejstava  sive 
ekonomije  na  održivost  javnog  duga,  is-
tovremeno  prateći  procene  o  veličini  sive 
ekonomije  u  Turskoj.  Koristeći  procene 
izvesnih  stručnjaka,  reevaluiramo  mak-
roekonomsku situaciju u Turskoj. Suštinu 
naše  diskusije  predstavlja  način  na  koji 
bi uključenje sive ekonomije u legalne to-
kove uticalo na vladinu politiku zajmova. 
Da bismo razmotrili uticaj sive ekonomije 
na  održivost,  koristili  smo  različite  indi-
katore održivosti. Uočena je značajna ra-
zlika između onih proračuna koji uzimaju 
u obzir obim sive ekonomije kao udeo u 
ekonomskom sistemu i onih koji isključuju 
sivu ekonomiju kao egzogenu varijablu.
KLJUČNE REČI: javni dug, siva ekonomi-
ja, održivost
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This paper aims to analyze the links between shadow economy
1 and public debt. 
In the last decades, public debt and shadow economy have been anticipated as 
critical problems for both developed and developing countries. As the volume of 
shadow  economy  rises  from  day  to  day,  politicians  have  become  more 
concerned about the stability of macro indicators. Shadow economic activities – 
employment, production and exchange unreported to government authorities – 
constitute  a  large  and  growing  part  of  all  economic  activity  throughout  the 
world (Schneider, 2000:81). Even though there are various attempts – challenges 
even – in order to prevent the increase in the size of the dark economy, as an 
emerging issue shadow economy still has a priority among those dealt with by 
policy makers. 
Public debt can be considered as the second important issue which makes the 
government’s job harder. Regardless of the level of development, most countries 
have experienced the repercussions of their borrowing policies. Especially in the 
transition countries, that fact creates a volatile economic performance as a result 
of the fragile structures of the markets. The re-payments of the public debt and 
the rise of government spending enlarge the dimensions of the problem in those 
low performing economies. 
Our analysis is an attempt to show the connection between these two inter-
related issues in Turkey. Up to now, both of them have been accepted as the 
cornerstones of the stabilization policies by almost every government. However, 
as a result of the awareness of the policy makers about the relationship between 
those two, Turkish economy has become a riskier country for those involved. 
2. The Definiton and Size of Shadow Economy 
There is a large volume of literature on shadow economy; as a result of the 
numerous studies and various techniques used by scholars in order to analyze 
the phenomenon, there are a lot of definitions. However, one commonly used 
working definition is: 
1  In  this  study  shadow  economy,  dark  economy,  hidden  economy,  informal  economy, 
underground and unoffical economy will be used interchangeably. 
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observed) gross national product but are currently unregistered (Schneider 
and Enste, 2000a:78).” 
The definitions differ as a result of the various techniques used by scholars and 
there are still disagreements about the definition of shadow economy activities 
(Schneider  and  Enste,  2000b:3).  However,  unofficial  economy  constitutes 
activities that are not recorded in the government statistics (Choi and Thum 
2005:2)  and  many  authors  have  reached  an  agreement  that  it  is  mainly  an 
increasing burden of taxation, social security contributions and excessive state 
regulatory activities combined with labour market restrictions that have heavily 
contributed  to  the  growth  of  underground  economies  (Bouev,2002:Non-
technical Summary) . 
As in the above argued issue, it is also very hard to measure the size of unofficial 
economy in a single manner. Regardless of whether shadow economic activity is 
viewed as adverse or benign, there are clearly benefits to understanding its size 
and  extent;,  considerable  work  has  been  devoted  to  estimating  the  size  of 
shadow  economy,  using  a  variety  of  methods.  Unfortunately,  all  of  these 
methods  are  to  some  degree  different  and  appear  to  generate  divergent 
estimates (Fleming, Roman and Farrell, 2000:398). 
In  this  study,  the  estimations  which  were  calculated  by  Schneider  (2005), 
Schneider  and  Savaşan  (2005)  via  DYMIMIC  (dynamic  multiple-indicators 
multiple causes) Model will be used for Turkey over the period over 1999-2003 
and  the  estimations  calculated  by  Savaşan  (2003)  via  MIMIC  (multiple-
indicators multiple causes) Model will be used for Turkey over the period 1991-
1998. There will be no further looking into the size or measuring techniques of 
shadow economy other than the above mentioned in this section. 
2.1. The Size of the Shadow Economy in Turkey 
Firstly,  we  had  an  intent  to  use  the  estimates  which  were  calculated  via 
DYMIMIC  Model  for  all  of  the  study  as  a  result  of  its  dynamic  structure. 
However, the mentioned model was used for estimation after the year 1998, so 
we had to use the estimates which were calculated by MIMIC Model for the 
years before 1999. 
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for the sake of checking the effects of multiple indicators on hidden economy in 
a dynamic manner. By this way, some assumptions are more relaxed and the 
error  which  is  caused  by  looking  from  one  point  of  view  is  minimized. 
Schneider explains the reason of why using DYMIMIC Model is better: 
“It  is  based  on  the  statistical  theory  of  unobserved  variables,  which 
considers multiple causes and multiple indicators of the phenomenon to be 
measured.  For  the  estimation,  a  factor-analytic  approach  is  used  to 
measure the hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The 
unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within 
which  the  “unobserved”  variable  cannot  be  measured  directly.  The 
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model consists 
in  general  of  two  parts,  with  the  measurement  model  linking  the 
unobserved  variables  to  observed  indicators.  The  structural  equations 
model specifies causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In this 
case, there is one unobserved variable, or the size of the shadow economy, 
this  is  assumed  to  be  influenced  by  a  set  of  indicators  for  the  shadow 
economy’s  size,  thus  capturing  the  structural  dependence  of  the  shadow 
economy on variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and 
size in the future (Schneider and Klingmair,2004:39).“ 
In Table 1, Column A shows the estimations made about the size of the shadow 
economy in Turkey between the years 1991-2003. The realised GNP of Turkey is 
given in Column B for the same years. In column C, the realised GNP data was 
recalculated by adding the size of unofficial economy to the realized one.  
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Realized GNP Data 
  A  B  C 
Years 
The Size of Shadow 
Economy (as a 
percentage of GNP)
Registered GNP 
(in billion US $) 
Registered+Unregistered 
GNP 
(in billion US $) 
1991  0.205  152.4  183.6 
1992  0.230  160.7  197.7 
1993  0.228  182  223.5 
1994  0.255  131.1  164.6 
1995  0.160  172  199.5 
1996  0.188  184.7  219.5 
1997  0.246  194.4  242.2 
1998  0.280  206  263.7 
1999  0.321  187.7  247.9 
2000  0.321  201.5  266.1 
2001  0.332  144.6  192.6 
2002  0.343  182.9  245.7 
2003  0.348  238.4  321.4 
Source: Column A: Schneider (2005), Schneider and Savaşan (2005), Savaşan (2003), Column B: 
Turkish Treasury Statistics, Column C: Calculated by authors 
3. The Analysis 
In this study, the relation between the public debt and the shadow economy will 
be analyzed. The rationale which lies at the core of the analysis is the following: 
If  the  hidden  economy  in  Turkey  could  be  recorded,  what  changes  would  be 
experienced in debt sustainability?  
As it does all over the world, shadow economy accounts for a larger and larger 
share  of  GDP  in  Turkey  (Najman,  2003).  The  distortion  effect  of  the  black 
economy performs as a multiplier on the negative effects of the high level public 
debt. The reasons which deepen the debt problem are high interest rates and the 
terms of the borrowing. Governments prefer tighter fiscal policies in order to 
sustain the debt as a result of this fact. They generally choose to increase the tax 
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of their interests. As a result, more tax-payers perform their economic activities 
in the underground in order to pay less tax, and the size of the shadow economy 
is a proxy measure of the Hard-to-Tax 
2(Alm et all, 2004:19). So the taxation 
reforms realized in order to increase the tax revenue cause a rise in the size of 
the shadow economy, and more underground activities mean less tax income 
and more social transfer. By this way, the effort of the government in order to 
decrease the debt stock and repay the debt actually increases the government's 
additional financial resources needed. Furthermore, the size of the debt problem 
has been inevitably enlarging from day to day as a result of this vicious circle. 
However, in our opinion, the real solution for the public borrowing problem is 
to  record  the  unofficial  economic  activities.  We  believe  that  if  governments 
succeeded in that, the debt stock would decrease and the size of debt would 
mean no more problem for Turkish economy. In this study, we investigated the 
effects of recording the unofficial economics activities on the debt sustainability 
in Turkey. 
As it can be remembered, we determined that the shadow economy data will be 
used. Next, in this section we mentioned the debt sustainability indicators which 
will  be  used.  Two  indicators  which  are  explained  below  will  be  used  in  the 
analysis: 
3.1 The One-Period Primary Gap
1 ( ) t GAP  
The One-Period Primary Gap indicator was developed by Buiter (1995):  
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1
t GAP ,  the  one-period  primary  gap  in  period  t  is  excess  of  the  augmented 
primary surplus-GDP ratio that stabilizes this period’s debt-GDP ratio over the 
2  Taxing certain kinds of activities, sectors or individuals is called Hard-to-Tax (Alm et al., 
2004:2). 
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indicator was developed in order to measure the difference between the next 
period (t+1) required primary surplus and the current one (t). If the calculated 
difference between these terms are positive, this fact means the fiscal policy is 
unsustainable and there is an urgent need for a policy reform in order to prevent 
insolvency. 
The  term  1 1
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t
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r g
b
g
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  shows  the  required  primary  surplus  and  the  term 
t s
 
shows the current primary surplus. In this equation, the notations  , , , r b g s  
denote the following ones respectively: 
• ; r  the domestic real interest rate 
• ; b   the  nominal  value  of  the  total  net  stock  of  non-monetary  financial 
liabilities  of  the  Combined  Public  Sector  at  the  end  of  the  mentioned 
period, as a fraction of that period’ s GDP  
• ; g  the rate of growth of real GDP 
• ; s  the primary surplus as a fraction of GDP 
3.2 The Medium-Term Tax Gap Indicator
3 
The Medium-Term Tax Gap Indicator was developed by Blanchard et al. (1990).  
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The indicator shows the difference between the sustainable (for the next five 
years) tax ratio
* ( ) t and the current one( ) t t . If the result is positive, the fact 
shows that there is a need to increase the tax ratio in order to provide debt 
sustainability. 
                                                
3  In this study only short and medium term indicators will be used in order to minimize the 
estimating errors 
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• ; b  the current debt as a fraction of GDP  
• ; r  the domestic real interest rate 
• ; n  the rate of growth of real GDP 
•
5
0
1
;
5
t i
i
g +
= ¦  the average of government non interest spending as fraction 
of GDP for the next five years 
3.3.  The Revision of Data’s and Sustainability Indicators via Aggregating Official and 
Shadow Economy in Turkey 
The  Primary  Gap  Indicator.  Firstly,  in  Table  2  there  are  the  results  of  the 
calculation of Primary Gap Indicator in Turkey via realized data. 
As it can be remembered, if the primary gap is positive, this shows the debt is 
unsustainable.  Between  the  years  1991-2003,  the  primary  gap  indicator  was 
positive for 10 years and the number of negative indicators was only three. This 
demonstrates that the debt stock is a real problem for Turkish economy. 
Table 2. The Official Primary Gap Indicator between 1991-2003 in Turkey 
Years 
Official Rate of 
Growth 
Official Sustainable
 
Primary Surplus
4 
Official Primary 
Gap Indicator
5 
1991  0.00  0.01  0.03 
1992  0.06  0.01  0.02 
1993  0.08  0.12  0.12 
1994  -0.06  0.04  0.00 
1995  0.08  0.09  0.05 
1996  0.07  0.05  0.04 
1997  0.08  0.04  0.04 
1998  0.04  0.16  0.11 
1999  -0.06  -0.10  -0.12 
                                                
4  ( )/(1 ) r i π π ≡ − +  
5  GNP is used instead of GDP. 
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2001  -0.10  0.04  -0.03 
2002  0.08  0.08  0.04 
2003  0.06  0.02  -0.03 
Source:  Turkish  Treasury  Statistics  (1990-2003),  International  Monetary  Fund  (2000-2003), 
Turkish Statistical Institute (1990-2003), State Planning Organization (1990-2003) 
In Table 3, the primary gap indicator is recalculated under the assumption of 
the shadow economy recorded and GNP anticipated as the sum of both official 
and unofficial economies. 
Table 3. The “O+U” (Official+Unofficial) Primary Gap Indicator between 1991-
2003 in Turkey 
Years 
O+U Rate of 
Growth
6 
O+U Sustainable 
Primary Surplus 
O+U Primary Gap 
Indicator
7 
1991  0.00  0.01  -0.01 
1992  0.08  -0.00  -0.02 
1993  0.13  0.20  0.18 
1994  -0.26  -0.01  -0.09 
1995  0.21  0.06  0.01 
1996  0.10  0.04  -0.01 
1997  0.10  0.02  -0.02 
1998  0.09  0.12  0.03 
1999  -0.06  -0.08  -0.16 
2000  0.07  0.34  0.21 
2001  -0.28  -0.08  -0.22 
2002  0.28  -0.06  -0.18 
2003  0.31  -0.06  -0.19 
Source: Calculated by authors 
There is a great difference observed between Table 2 and Table 3. As it can be 
seen above, in the analysis in which unrecorded economy was included as an 
                                                
6  Calculated by authors 
7  GNP is used instead of GDP. 
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indicator was positive was only three. It is obvious that if all economic activities 
were recordable, then Turkish Economy would not have such a fragile structure, 
and probably the debt stock would not be a significant problem for the stability. 
We think that situation is created by the difference between official growth rate 
and O+U growth rate. In Figure 1, it can be easily observed. 
Figure 1. The Comparison of the Official and O+U Growth Rates 1990-2004 
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Source: Turkish Treasury Statistics 
The  most  interesting  deviations  between  the  two  rates  were  experienced  in 
1994-1995 and 2001-2002. In those years, a large number of both domestic and 
foreign factors caused great crises. Turkish Economy was in a great depression 
and there was a lack of stability. So we can say that in the years in which low 
economic performance is observed, the size of the shadow economy increases 
hugely. 
The Medium-Term Tax Gap Indicator. 
In Table 4, the medium-term tax gap indicator was calculated with the official 
data. 
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tax rates had to be increased. Maybe, today’s economic performance is a result 
of the wrong fiscal policies of those years; from this point of view there is a 
welfare transfer between the generations. 
Table 4. The Official Medium-Term Tax Gap Indicator between 1991-1998 in 
Turkey 
Years  Non-Interest Spending 
to GNP Ratio
8 
Official Sustainable 
Tax Ratio 
Official Tax Gap 
Indicator
9 
1991  0.17  0.24  0.11 
1992  0.16  0.21  0.08 
1993  0.18  0.20  0.07 
1994  0.15  0.34  0.19 
1995  0.14  0.12  -0.02 
1996  0.16  0.41  0.26 
1997  0.19  0.23  0.07 
1998  0.18  0.27  0.10 
Source: State Planning Organization (Non-Interest Spending/GNP) 
In  Table  5,  the  O+U  sustainable  tax  ratio  and  O+U  tax  gap  indicator  were 
calculated.  Regardless  of  the  choice  of  data  (official  or  O+U),  in  all  years 
between 1991-1998 except for 1995, there was a need to increase the tax ratio in 
order to sustain the debt. However, it is obviously understood that the needed 
rises in tax rates were very low in O+U calculations relatively. Except in 1996, 
there was a 3% average difference between the needed official rise and O+U rise. 
That can be accepted as a proof for the shadow economy’s distortion effect on 
Turkish  economy.  Furthermore,  3%  is  a  very  significant  rate  for  Turkish 
Taxation System regardless of who pays it. That means that a redistribution of 
income, which diverges to the pareto-optimal allocations, is experienced. This 
type of redistribution could touch the most sensitive moral values of the society, 
since  sometimes  tax  differences  are  not  as  important  as  income  differences 
(Hanousek and Palda, 2003:163).  
                                                
8  GNP used instead of GDP 
9  Tax Burden used as tax ratio 
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same  as  in  the  above  discussed  topic  in  Figure  1.  As  a  result  of  the  1995 
depression, the enlargement in the size of shadow economy caused deviations 
from the aimed total tax income which was planned by Revenue Service. So 
there was an alternative method in order to increase the tax income, that of an 
increase in the tax rate. In the following years, as a result of the rise in the tax 
rate, Turkey has experienced high tax burden and the other repercussions of the 
fiscal based compensation policies deeply at the cost of low levels of overall 
welfare. 
Table  5.  The  Official+Unofficial  Medium-Term  Tax  Gap  Indicator  between 
1991-1998 in Turkey 
Years 
O+U 
Sustainable Tax Ratio 
O+U 
Tax Gap Indicator
10 
1991  0.21  0.09 
1992  0.20  0.07 
1993  0.18  0.05 
1994  0.31  0.15 
1995  0.13  -0.01 
1996  0.51  0.36 
1997  0.17  0.01 
1998  0.19  0.02 
Source: Calculated by authors 
3.4. Some Other Dimensions of Public Debt and Shadow Economy Relation 
The Primary Surplus and the Shadow Economy 
The reason for the high tax rates should be examined from the point of the 
shadow economy in a different manner as well. The shadow economy is also 
very effective on the analysis of total debt stock as a fraction of GNP. As it can 
be seen in Figure 2, there is an important difference between the official debt 
stock/GNP ratios and O+U debt stock/GNP ratios. As a result of this difference, 
a  higher  primary  surplus  is  advised  by  economists  in  order  to  be  solvent 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994:582). A higher primary surplus means higher tax 
                                                
10  Tax Burden used as tax ratio 
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public health and culture.  
Figure 2. The Comparison of the Ratios of Public Sector Net Debt Stock to 
Official and U+O GNP in Turkey between 1990-2004 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (1990-1999), Turkish Treasury Statistics (2000-2004) 
The loss of tax income caused by shadow economy changes the budget balance 
in a critical way and references more fiscal discipline both for public revenues 
and spending. In Table 6, the primary budget balance can be seen via both the 
realised and revised data. 
The  primary  budget  balance  which  is  focused  by  most  policy  makers  is  a 
powerful indicator in determining the fiscal policy. The primary budget balance 
in Turkey is seen very differently with regard to whether the unofficial activities 
are included in it or not. Furthermore, as the size of shadow economy decreases, 
the fiscal policies will vary gradually in favour of the household and the overall 
welfare in society will follow a parallel path in Turkey. 
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Dollar) 
Years 
Official Primary 
Budget Balance 
The Additional Tax 
Revenue From the 
Unrecorded Activities 
O+U Primary Budget 
Balance 
1991  -1769912  3170456  1400544 
1992  -816517  3798960  2982443 
1993  -1104438  4159193  3054755 
1994  3818678  3893463  7712141 
1995  4253516  2827465  7080981 
1996  2443426  3904759  6348185 
1997  204141  5674099  5878240 
1998  7551793  8223298  15775091 
1999  2891084  8755308  11646392 
2000  10629567  12603906  23233473 
2001  8313804  9120108  17433912 
2002  7173109  12453684  19626793 
2003  13122368  20920232  34042600 
2004  19427555  26372308  45799862 
Source: Turkish Ministry of Finance Budget Reports 
The Tax Revenue and Interest Payments 
The  first  sentence  of  Blanchard  and  Weil’s  study  “Dynamic  Efficiency,  The 
Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games Under Undercertainty” is the following: 
“Can  governments  roll  their  debt  over  forever  in  dynamically  efficient 
economies, and thus avoid the need to raise taxes? (Blanchard and Weil, 
1992: Abstract)” 
This is really a critical question which investigates the financial constraints of 
the  governments.  Rising  taxes  is  a  magical  policy  instrument  for  the 
governments  –  as  it  was  experienced  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  1993 
(Sutherland, 1997:147). The answer to the question depends on the restrictions 
which exist on the capacity to tax and which also account for the government’s 
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affects government expenditures and policies definitely (Davis and Henrekson, 
2004:1). 
Under fairly tight restrictions on the government’s tax menu, rolling over of 
debt  infinitely  in  the  long  term  is  a  very  hard,  almost  impossible,  process;. 
because in the rolling over mechanism the share of the debt interest payments 
increases as it converges to infinity.  
As a result of short maturity and increasing interest payments, the need of the 
government for new income sources is becoming more urgent every day, and 
after an uncertain time period Pozi Finance becomes inevitable faith for the 
government. However, there is an alternative way in order to roll debt over also 
under the assumption of tight restrictions.  
Tight  and  fair  restrictions  on  a  taxation  menu  come  together  and  create  a 
protective  system  which  is  designed  for  the  security  of  personal  rights  and 
freedoms. In this way, the arbitrary and despotic decisions of the policy makers 
(putting up new taxes whenever they need any extra income regardless of the 
effects on inequality) are no more threats for freedom.  
As  mentioned  above,  also  under  tight  restrictions,  governments  can  prevent 
insolvency. However, only a small group of people are aware of the effect of the 
shadow economy on taxation. More economic analysis of taxation neglects the 
underground sector (Davis and Henrekson, 2004:5). But the solution for the 
above mentioned problem is decreasing the size of shadow economy so the tax 
income could be increased without any need to invent new taxation techniques. 
In Figure 3, the chart compares the official tax income, interest payments and 
O+U tax income in Turkey between 1997-2004. As it is noticed, the difference 
between the official tax income and O+U tax income follows an increasing trend 
from year to year.  
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Tax Income in Turkey between 1997-2004 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Interest Payments Offical Tax Income O+U Tax Income
 
Source: State Planning Organization, Turkish Ministry of Finance 
Table 7. The Ratio of Interest Payments to the Official Tax Income and O+U 
Tax Income 
Year 
Interest 
Payments/ 
Official Tax 
Income 
(IP/OTI) 
Interest 
Payments/ 
O+U Tax 
Income 
(IP/O+UTI) 
Year
Interest 
Payments/ 
Official Tax 
Income 
(IP/OTI) 
Interest 
Payments/ 
O+U Tax 
Income ( 
IP/O+UTI) 
1991  0.31  0.25  1998 0.67  0.52 
1992  0.28  0.23  1999 0.72  0.55 
1993  0.44  0.36  2000 0.77  0.58 
1994  0.51  0.40  2001 1.03  0.78 
1995  0.53  0.46  2002 0.87  0.65 
1996  0.67  0.56  2003 0.70  0.52 
1997  0.48  0.39  2004 0.56  0.41 
Source: (IP/OTI) Turkish Ministry of Finance Budget Reports, (IP/O+UTI) Calculated by the 
Author 
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payments to the tax incomes in Turkey was examined via both official data and 
under the assumption of the shadow economy recorded. As it is seen above, 
between the years 1991-2004, the arithmetic average of the ratio which is equal 
to interest payments over official tax income is 0.61; however, when the average 
was recalculated using O+U tax income instead of only the official one, 0.47 was 
found as new value. The difference of 0.14 can be regarded as a very critical 
indicator under the assumption that the volume of the shadow economy was 
added to the official one, which means that the tax income can serve its basic 
goals in a more efficient manner in order to increase the level of satistifaction of 
the citizens whose welfare is very dependent on national security, externalities, 
social security, health, education and so forth. 
4. Conclusions 
As  a  conclusion,  a  political-economic  revision  of  fiscal  policy  has  to  be 
considered urgently in Turkey. The shadow economy’s distortion pressure on 
markets does not only affect macroeconomic performance but also supports 
disrespectful behaviours against human rights
11. 
Shadow Economy can be considered as one – maybe the most important – of 
the main causes of the debt accumulation in Turkey. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the total debt stock of Turkey was not greater than 35% of the GNP. 
However, in the 2000s, debt stabilization programmes have been the primary 
priority of the government. 
With the 1980s, a new period in Turkish economy began. Fiscal liberalization 
was taken into account by policy makers in order to provide a rapid transition 
to  an  open  economy.  As  a  result  of  rapid  evolution,  most  regulations  were 
relaxed simultaneously. The changes enabled certain enterpreneurs to shift their 
current economic activities underground and create new activities which could 
not be recorded by anybody. 
                                                
11  "Disrespectful  behaviours  against  human  rights"  emphasises  working  conditions  in  the 
underground sector, the intergenerational transfer of welfare and the unfair redistribution of 
income via failures in taxation system etc.; however, those issues are not evaluated in this 
study any further because of the limitd scope of the paper.  
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parallelism observed between the rise of public debt and the rise of the size of 
shadow economy. In 2001, the public sector total debt was approximately 140 
percent of GNP in Turkey. 
After  the  1980s,  the  revenue  of  the  public  sector  was  generally  under  the 
expectations.  The  government  needed  more  financial  resources  in  order  to 
compensate for the lack of revenue and accumulate funds for the integration 
process.  The  chosen  instrument  was  borrowing  in  order  to  provide  an 
additional  financial  resource.  The  instrument  chosen  temporarily  at  the 
beginning became permanent as a result of the simplicity. When the repayment 
time  was  up,  the  dream  turned  into  a  shock.  The  most  vital  mistake  was 
experienced at that time. Governments should be aware of the vicious circle into 
which they would push the people of their country. All effort should have been 
aimed at recording the underground economic activities and the repayments 
would have been settled by the new resources provided by decreasing the size of 
the  shadow  economy.  However,  that  solution  was  not  preferred  by  the 
government because of various reasons such as populism, self-interest and rent-
seeking. Since, the shadow economy has not been only anticipated as one of the 
causes which creates a debt trap but also as a factor that deepens the dimension 
of the debt problem. 
Nowadays, both the shadow economy and the debt stock are accepted as the 
most important problems of the Turkish Economy. IMF and World Bank are 
observing whether Turkish politicians apply macroeconomic policies leading to 
stabilization or not. So, first of all, a challenge against the shadow economy 
should  come  into  the  agenda.  If  the  reduction  of  the  size  of  the  shadow 
economy realized, high public debt would decrease to acceptable levels in short 
time with no more sacrifice. 
In  order  to  produce  solutions,  firstly  the  causes  of  the  problems  must  be 
analysed in a detailed manner. So the policy makers who are responsible for 
stabilizing Turkish economy should know the economic history of Turkey to 
start with. 
102
A.B.Yereli, İ.E.Seçilmiş and A. BaşaranShadow economy and debt sustainability in Turkey
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alm, J., Martinez-Vasquez J. and F. Schneider (2004), “Sizing The Problem Of Hard-To-Tax”, AY-
SPS Conference: The Hard-to-Tax, An International Perspective
Bouev, M. (2002) “Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour Market Approach”, 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 524
Blanchard, O. J., J-C. Chouraqui, R. P. Hagemann and N. Sortor, (1990), “The Sustainability of 
Fiscal Policy: New Answers To An Old Question, OECD Economic Studies No:15
Blanchard, O.J. and P. Weil (1992), “Dynamic Efficiency, The Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games 
Under Undercertainty”, National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3992
Buiter,W H. (1995), “Measuring Fiscal Sustainability”, mimeo, Cambridge University
Buiter, W.H. and K.M. Kletzer, (1992), “Government Solvency, Ponzi Finance and The Redun-
dancy and Usefulness Of Public Debt”, National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 4076
Choi, J. P. and M. Thum (2005), “Corruption and The Shadow Economy”, International Economic 
Review, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 817-836, 
Davis, SJ. and M. Henrekson (2004), “Tax Effects On Work Activity, Industry Mix and Shadow 
Economy Size: Evidence From Rich-Country Comparisons”, National Bureau Of Economic Re-
search Working Paper No. 10509
Dornbusch, R. and S. Fischer (1994), Macroeconomics, McGrawHill, International - Sixth Edi-
tion
Fleming, M.H., J. Roman and G. Farrell (2000), “The Shadow Economy”, Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 387-409
Hanousek, J. and F. Palda, (2003), “Why People Evade Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics: 
A Tale Of Twins”, The Informal Economy In The EU Accession Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and 
Challenges To The Process Of EU Enlargement, Center For The Study Of Democracy, pp.139-173
Najman, B. (2003), “Development Economic Policy: How To Integrate Shadow Economy”, Rein-
venting Development Conference, Belgrade, Institut Ekonomskih Nauka
Savaşan, F. (2003), ”Modelling the Underground Economy in Turkey: Randomized Response and 
MIMIC Models”, Journal of Economics, v. XXIX, No.1, pp. 49-76104
A.B.Yereli, İ.E.Seçilmiş and A. Başaran
Schneider, F. (2005), “Shadow Economies of 145 Countries All Over The World: Estimation Re-
sults Over The Period 1999, University of Linz: Dpartment of Economics, Discussion Paper Linz, 
Austria 
Schneider, F. (2000), “Dimensions Of The Shadow Economy”, The Independent Review, v. 1, pp. 
81-91
Schneider, F. and D.H. Enste (2000a), “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes and Consequences”, Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 77-114
Schneider, F. and D.H. Enste (2000b), “Shadow Economies Around The World: Size, Causes and 
Consequences”, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/26
Schneider, F. and R. Klinglmair (2004), “Shadow Economies Around The World: What Do We 
Know?”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1043
Schneider, F. and F. Savaşan (2005), “ The Size of Shadow Economies of Turkey (and of her Neigh-
bouring Countries) Including an Informal Hiring and Sectoral Anaylsis of the Turkish Shadow 
Economy”, www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/Schneider/
Sutherland, A. J. (1997), “Fiscal Crises and Aggregate Demand: Can High Public Debt Reverse The 
Effects Of Fiscal Policy?”, Journal of Public Economics 65, pp. 147-162